Blogiversary, Part II

So it’s now been two years since I launched OnlyOnce.  Last year at this time, I gave a bunch of stats of how my blog was going.

The interesting thing about this year, is that a lot of these stats seem to have leveled off.  I have almost the same number of subscribers (email and RSS) and unique visits as last year.  The number’s not bad — it’s in the thousands — and I’m still happy to be writing the blog for all the reasons I expressed here back in June 2004, but it’s interesting that new subs seem to be harder to come by these days.  I assume that’s a general trend that lots of bloggers are seeing as the world of user-generated content gets more and more crowded.

Not that I’m competitive with my board members, but I believe that Brad and Fred have both continued to see massive subscriber increases in their blogs.  They attribute it to two things — (1) they have lots of money they give to entrepreneurs, and (2) they write a lot more than I do, usually multiple postings per day, as compared to a couple postings per week. 

I don’t see either of those aspects of my blog changing any time soon, so if those are the root causes, then I’ll look forward to continuing this for my existing readers (and a few more here and there) into 2007!

It’s Not Having What You Want, It’s Wanting What You’ve Got

I’ve always thought that line (the title of this post) was one of Sheryl Crowe’s better lyrics. And there’s nothing like moving houses to bring it to life. We are pretty minimalist to begin with, or at least the size of our apartment had constrained our ability to be anything more. And we cleaned out and threw away a bunch of things before we moved. Now that we’re almost done unpacking, and we have several empty or nearly empty rooms in our much larger house, the lyric resonates.

I’m sure we’ll ultimately fill up those empty rooms, at least a little bit. That’s what everyone says happens when you expand into more space. But for the most part, we don’t NEED to. The furniture, toys, beds, and chairs that worked for us in one place SHOULD work for us in another. Happiness can’t come from forging forward on the volume of earthly possessions. It should really come from contentment when where you are in life. Anything else is icing on the cake.

That’s probably a good metaphor to think about the road ahead in business and the economy. It’s still not clear to me how much this current mess is going affect the general economy and spending across all sectors. Hopefully confidence returns to the financial markets, the credit crisis passes, and there’s not a general deep recession. But as my colleague Anita is so fond of saying, Hope is not a Strategy, so everyone needs to be bracing themselves for the worst right now.

And that means we all need to prepare for Not Having What We Want, but rather Wanting What We’ve Got. Businesses will continue to function and even grow if there’s a recession. But if there’s belt tightening to be done, it means that growth companies will have to shift paradigms a bit. They’ll be investing less in growth and in new things. They’ll be focusing more on profits. There will be less hiring. Promotions and raises and bonuses will be harder to come by (especially on Wall Street!).

None of this means we should stop forging ahead or reduce our ambitions. On the contrary – companies that can figure out how to achieve both growth AND profitability in tough times are the ones that win in the end. But it does mean that we’re in for a long road if we don’t all change our mindset and behaviors to match the times, as growth and profitability together looks quite different from growth at the expense of profitability.

More thoughts on some of Fred’s and Brad’s points about VC deal algebra, valuation, and liquidation preferences for venture-funded startups. My apologies if this gets a little too technical or too long!

On liquidation preference: Preferred stock makes sense, participating preferred makes less sense. Sure, a VC who puts capital at risk in a startup should be entitled to get his or her money out before management and common shareholders who are paid to run the business. But I’ve always had an issue (even when I was in the venture business, although admittedly not as a partner) with the participating preferred security which allows VCs to get their money out first, and then still receive their proportional share of the rest. Fred calls this “a loan with an option,” and that’s the best presentation I’ve ever heard of the security. But what’s always struck me as a bit over the top about this is that it gives VCs downside protection at the same time they’re negotiating even more upside in a deal.

One simple solution to this, if you can negotiate it, is a “kickout” provision which makes the participation feature on the security go away if the company becomes worth a multiple (usually 2x or 3x) of the post-money valuation of the financing. In other words, it gives the VC the downside protection they want but gives you and other shareholders more of the upside if things go really, really well.

On valuation and deal algebra: I completely agree that valuation is a derived number and that it’s completely misunderstood in early stage investing. However, I think that while there may be low correlation between valuation and what the business is worth today, there are a few things that have always bugged me about VC valuations:

While I understand that valuation is more a function of future potential than current value, it sometimes feels like companies get punished for having a track record. Let me clear about my point – it’s not that that I actually think VCs lower valuations unfairly when companies demonstrate poor results. It’s actually the opposite. VCs are quick to bid up the valuation on companies that don’t have revenue or even a lot of operations just because the idea is cool or because the theoretical market is large (Friendster, anyone?). I don’t think VCs as a group do a good enough job of risk-adjusting or future-competition-adjusting valuations for new companies, or they get caught up in what Fred once called Venture Fratricide and just pour money into new sectors en masse. This has the unintended side effect of making management teams of existing companies feel like their ideas aren’t interesting any more because they’re not new and shiny.

Second, it’s interesting to note that while VCs use valuation as a way of placing limits and getting protection on their bet about the future potential of the company and entrepreneur, entrepreneurs have no corresponding mechanism to place limits or receive protection against having a bad VC. (VCs actually have many tools at their disposal to reign in poorly performing management teams once the deal is signed – they can fire them, cram them down, force all their common stock to be on a vesting schedule or subject to clawback.) But make no mistake about it – a bad VC can almost kill a company, or certainly keep it from realizing its full potential, and once that deal is signed, the entrepreneur typically has little recourse. I’m not sure there’s an easy solution to this particular problem either, but it’s one that’s worth thinking through with a good lawyer the next time you negotiate a term sheet with a new venture investor (and certainly one that is easier to negotiate if you either have a good track record as an entrepreneur or multiple VCs interested in your company). I made one suggestion around participation in future financings in my earlier posting on term sheet negotiations — item #8.

The final thing that’s bugged me about valuations stems from what Fred calls the 1/3 rule (1/3 of a VC’s investments work out well, 1/3 go sideways, 1/3 go bad). As a result of the rule, valuations and deal structures can end up being about VCs getting as much upside as possible out of their winning deals to cover their losses from their zero-return deals. What bugs me about this is that entrepreneurs don’t have that same luxury of a diversified portfolio – they are 100% invested in terms of their human capital and often their investment capital in their company. I fully realize that this is the nature of the beast, but I’ve always felt as a result that entrepreneurs should negotiate – and VCs should be willing to give – proportionally much more upside to management in the event that the deal turns out to be a big winner. This point relates back to my first point about participating preferred securities.

Next up in this series…Reverse Engineering Venture Economics, and managing other kinds of investors (Angel and Strategic).

The Very Unfriendly Skies of United

The 6 a.m. flight from LaGuardia to Denver is unpleasant to begin with, but the idiots who set customer-facing policies at United seem to have found a new way of making it even less pleasant.

I’ve long-hated United’s “Economy Plus” seating, which gives the first 5-10 rows of coach a huge amount of leg room at the expense of all the other rows in coach.  American, by contrast, has more leg room in all rows of coach, so I can actually work in any seat on an American plane, laptop and all.  On United, the seats in the majority of coach are almost unworkable.

United used to just automatically put you in Economy Plus if you were a frequent flier with status.  But now United is taking Economy Plus to a new level — they’re automatically NOT putting you in Economy Plus and then charging more for it on the spot.  You can move yourself into Economy Plus for free online ahead of time, assuming there are open seats in it.  So really, the new policy is just designed to hold a gun to customers’ heads at the airport.

This morning’s flight is a prime example of how not to treat your customers.  It’s 6 a.m., and coach is maybe — maybe — half full.  And the announcement comes on that United’s new policy is that you are forbidden to move seats into Economy Plus after takeoff, even if there are open seats (which there are).  You can only do that if you pay $44, and a United representative would be happy to take that money at any time.

My colleague Angela had the best line on this situation — it’s as if United has put up an invisible electric fence in the middle of coach.  Whether or not there’s a ringing and a shock, it certainly feels like United is treating its customers like dogs.  They now join my customer service Hall of Shame along with Verizon (the anchor tenant) and Fedex/Kinko’s.

Feature Requests

Here are two new features I’d like to see in life:

1. Any time you hit “reply to all” when you are in the BCC line – a giant red alert should pop up and say “are you really sure you want to let all these people know that you were BCCd on this thread?”
2. Any time you place a call to a cell phone that’s outside of the person’s normal time zone – a giant red alert should pop up and say “are you sure you want to call this person at 3 a.m. in Singapore?” before completing the call

I’m not sure to whom these requests should be addressed, so I’ll just start with the open web.

How to Negotiate a Term Sheet with a VC, Part IV

Brad is making  new postings easy this week.  Here’s another good one from the VC’s perspective on liquidation preference.

Counter Cliche:  Failure Is Not an Orphan

I haven’t written one of these for a while, but this week, Fred’s VC Cliche of the Week, Success Has a Thousand Fathers, definitely merits an entrepreneurial point of view.  Fred’s main point is right — it’s very easy when something goes right, whether a company/venture deal or even something inside the company like a good quarter or a big new client win, for lots of people to take credit, many of whom don’t deserve it.

But what separates A companies from B and C companies is the ability to recognize and process failures as well as successes.  Failure is not orphan.  It usually has as many real fathers as success.  Although it’s true that Sometimes, There is No Lesson to Be Learned, failure rarely emerges spontaneously. 

Companies that have a culture of blame and denial eventually go down in flames.  They are scary places to work.  They foster in-fighting between departments and back-stabbing among friends.  Most important, companies like that are never able to learn from their mistakes and failures to make sure those things don’t happen again.

Finger-pointing and looking the other way as things go south have no place in a well-run organization.  While companies don’t necessarily need to celebrate failures, they can create a culture where failures are treated as learning experiences and where claiming responsibility for a mistake is a sign of maturity and leadership.  And all of this starts at the top.  If the boss (CEO, department head, line manager) is willing to step up and acknowledge a mistake, do a real post-mortem, and process the learnings with his or her team without fear of retribution, it sets an example that everyone in the organization can follow.

I’m fascinated with this topic and how it’s evolving in society. In Part I, a couple years ago now, I changed my long-held point of view from “CEOs should only wade into politics when there’s a direct impact on their business” (things like taxes and specific regulations, legal immigration) — to believing that CEOs can/should wade into politics when there’s an indirect impact on business. In that post, I defined my new line/scope as being one that includes the health and functioning of our democracy, which you can tie to business interests in so many ways, not the least of which this week is the Fitch downgrade of the US credit rating over governance concerns. Other CEOs will have other definitions of indirect, and obviously that’s ok. No judgment here!

I am a regular viewer of Meet the Press on Monday mornings in the gym on DVR. Have been for years. This weekend, Chuck Todd’s “Data Download” segment was all about this topic. The data he presented is really interesting:

58% of people think it’s inappropriate for companies to take stands on issues. The best that gets by party is that Democrats are slightly more inclined to think it’s appropriate for companies to take stands on issues (47/43), but for Republicans and Independents, it’s a losing issue by a wide margin.

To that end, consumers are likely to punish companies who DO take stands on issues, by an overall margin of 47/24 (not sure where everyone else is). The “more likely” applies to people of all political persuasions.

These last two tables of his are interesting. Lower income people feel like it’s inappropriate for companies to take stands on issues more than higher earners, but all income levels have an unfavorable view, and…

…older people are also more likely to have an unfavorable view of companies who wade into politics than younger people, but again, all ages have an unfavorable view

As I said in Part I of this series, “I still believe that on a number of issues in current events, CEOs face a lose-lose proposition by wading into politics,” risking alienation of customers, employees, and other stakeholders. The data from Meet the Press supports that, at least to some extent. That said, I also acknowledge that the more polarized and less functional the government is…the more of a leadership vacuum there is on issues facing us all.

There’s been a growing cry for tech companies to add diversity to their leadership teams and boards, and for good reason. Those two groups are the most influential decision making bodies inside companies, and it’s been well documented that diverse teams, however you define diversity — diversity of demographics, thoughts, professional experience, lived experience — make better decisions. 

Gender, racial, and ethnic representation in executive teams and in board rooms are not new topics.  There’s been a steady drumbeat of them over the last decade, punctuated by some big newsworthy moments like the revelations about Harvey Weinstein and the tragic murder of George Floyd.  

It’s also true that in people-focused organizations, and most tech companies claim to be just that, it’s beneficial to have different types of leaders in terms of role modeling and visibility across the company. As one younger woman on my team years ago said, “if you can see it…you can be it!”

My company Bolster is a platform for CEOs to efficiently build out their executive teams and boards. But while nearly every search starts with a diversity requirement, many don’t end that way. 

Here’s why, and here’s what can be done about it. 

For boards, the “why” is straightforward. Board searches are almost never a priority for CEOs. They’re viewed as optional. Bolster’s Board Benchmark study in 2021 indicated that only a third of private companies have independent directors at all;even later stage private companies only have independent directors two-thirds of the time. That same study indicated that 80% of companies had open Board seats. The comparable longitudinal study in 2022 indicated that the overwhelming majority of those open board seats were still open. 

Independent directors are usually the key to diversity, as the overwhelming majority of founders and VCs are still white and male. It takes a lot of time and effort to recruit and hire and onboard new directors, and in the world of important versus urgent, it will always be merely important. Without prioritizing hiring independents, board diversity may be a lofty goal, but it’s also an empty promise. I wrote about my Rule of 1s here and in Startup Boards – I wish more CEOs and VCs took the practice of independent boards and board diversity seriously. The silver lining here is that when CEOs do end up prioritizing a search for an independent director, they are increasingly open to diverse directors, even if those people have less experience than they might want. That openness to directors who may never have been on a corporate board (but who are board-ready), who may be a CXO instead of a CEO, is key. Of the several dozen independent directors Bolster has helped match to companies in the past year, almost 70% of them are from demographic populations that are historically underrepresented in the boardroom.

Diversity is stalling for Senior Executive hiring for the opposite reason. Exec hires are usually urgent enough that CEOs prioritize them. And they frequently start their searches by talking about the importance of diversity. But Senior Executives are much more often hired for their resume than for competency or potential. Almost all executive searches start with some variation of this line, which I’m lifting directly from a prior post: “I want to hire the person who took XYZ Famous Company from where I am today to 10x where I am today.” The problem with that is simple. That person is no longer available to be hired. They have made a ton of money, and they have moved beyond that job in their career progression. So inevitably, the search moves on to look for the person who worked for that person, or even one more layer down…or the person who that person WAS before they took the job at XYZ Famous Company. Those people may or may not be easy to find or available, but they feel less risky. In the somewhat insular world of tech, those candidates are also far less likely to be diverse in background, experience, thought, or, yes, demographics.

Running a comprehensive executive search based on competencies, cultural fit, scale experience, and general industry or analogous industry experience is much harder. It takes time, patience, digging deeper to surface overlooked candidates or to check references, and probably a little more risk taking on the part of CEOs. And while CEOs may be willing to take some risk on a first-time independent director, fewer are willing to take a comparable level of risk on an unproven or less known executive hire. 

For some CEOs, the answer is just to take more risk — or more to the point, recognize that any senior hire carries risk along a number of dimensions, so there’s no reason to prioritize your narrow view of resume pedigree over any critical vector. For others, the answer may be to bring the focus of diversity in senior hires to “second level” leaders like Managers, Directors, or VPs, where the perceived risk is lower, and the willingness to invest in training and mentorship is higher. Those people in turn can be promoted over time into more senior positions. 

Not every executive or board hire has to be demographically diverse. Not every executive team or board has to have individual quotas for different identity groups, and diversity has many flavors to it. But without doing the work, tech CEOs will continue to bemoan the lack of diversity in their leadership ranks, and miss out on the benefits of diverse leadership, while not taking ownership for those efforts stalling.

(This is the second in a series of three posts on this topic.)

In a previous post, I shared the difference between CEO Mentors and CEO Coaches. I’ll share with you here how to select the Mentors and Coach who are right for you.  First, you need to find candidates.  Whether you’re talking about CEO Coaches or CEO Mentors or both, getting referrals from trusted sources is the best way to go about this.  Those trusted sources could be your VC or independent board members, friends, fellow CEOs — or of course Bolster, where we have a significant number of Coaches and Mentors and have made it our business to vet and vouch for them.

Selecting a CEO Mentor is literally like selecting a teacher but at a vocational school, not at a research university.  You want to select someone who has done something several times or for several years; done it really well; documented it in some organized way (at least mentally); and can articulate what they did, why, what worked and what didn’t, and help you apply it to your situation.  Do you want to be taught how to be an electrician by someone with a PhD in Electrical Engineering, or by someone who has been a master electrician for 20 years?   Fit matters mostly around values.  It’s hard to get advice from someone whose values are quite different, as their experiences and their metrics for what did and didn’t work won’t apply well to yours.  Fit is a lot less around personality, although you have to be able to get along and communicate with the person at a basic level  Find someone with the right experience set that you can learn from RIGHT NOW.  Or at least this year.  Maybe the person is the right mentor next year, maybe not.  Depends on what you need.  For example, if you’re running a $10mm revenue DTC company, find someone who has scaled a company in the DTC or adjacent eCommerce space to at least $25-50mm. 

Although I’ve been very international in getting mentoring as a CEO over the years, I’ve never hired a formal CEO Mentor. Several people, from my dad to my independent directors to the members of my CEO Forum have played that role for me at different times over the years. Knowing what I know now, I’m working with CEO Mentors who have experience with talent marketplaces at different scale, since this is a new industry for me.

Selecting a CEO Coach is different.  I got lucky in my selection of a CEO Coach almost 20 years ago.  My board member Fred Wilson told me I needed to work with one, I naively rolled my eyes and said ok, he introduced me to Marc Maltz, I told Marc something like “I need a coach because clearly I need to learn how to manage my Board better,” and for some reason, he decided to take the assignment.  I got lucky because Marc ended up being exactly the right coach for me, going on 20 years now, but I didn’t know that at the time.  

Selecting a CEO Coach is all about who you “click with” personality wise, and what you need in order to be pushed to grow developmentally.  CEO Coaches come on a spectrum ranging from what I would call “Quasi-Psychiatrist” on one end, to “Quasi-Management Consultant” on the other end.  The former can be incredibly helpful — just note that you will find yourself talking about your thoughts, feelings, and family of origin a fair bit as a means of uncovering problems and solutions.  The latter can be helpful as well — just note that you will find yourself talking about business strategy and having someone hold up the proverbial mirror so you can see you the way other people see you as the CEO, quite a bit.  There is no right or wrong universal answer here to what makes someone the right choice for you.  For me, if one end of the spectrum is a 1 and the other is a 5, I prefer working with people who are in the 3-4 range.  

Therapy and coaching are different, though.  A good CEO Coach who is a 1 will refer clients to therapy if they see the need. While coaching can “feel” therapeutic, and actually may be therapeutic, it is not a replacement for therapy. The differences between the 1s and the 5s are not just style differences but also really what you want the content of the coaching to be.  A 1 is going to help you discover and drive to your leadership style.  A 5 is going to help you align those decisions to how you actually act, what approaches you bring to the organization and how you address challenges.  Some CEO Coaches can move back and forth between all of these, but knowing where you sit with your needs relative to the coach’s natural style when you pick a coach is critical.

I know CEOs who have shown tremendous growth as humans and leaders with Coaches who are 1s and Coaches who are 5s.  A good CEO Coach is someone you can work with literally forever.   

I always encourage CEOs to interview multiple Coaches and specifically ask them what their coaching process is like and what their coaching philosophy is.  How do they typically start engagements.  How structured or unstructured are they in their work?  Check references and ask some of their other CEO clients what it’s been like to work with them.  This is all true to a much lesser extent with Mentors.  In both cases, you should probably do a test session or two before signing up for a longer-term engagement.  You wouldn’t buy a car without taking it for a test drive.  This is an even more consequential decision.  

And in both cases, there should be no ego in the process.  You should never feel like you’re being sold by a CEO Coach or CEO Mentor.  And they shouldn’t feel hurt by you picking someone else, either.  Alignment and chemistry are so critical – there is no way to have that with every person, and the good professionals in this industry should know that.

The bottom line is that hiring a CEO Mentor is low risk. If it’s not working out, you stop engaging. Hiring a CEO Coach is a longer-term decision, and it’s worth having couple of sessions with a coach before making the commitment.

Next post in the series coming:  How to get the most out of working with a CEO Mentor or CEO Coach 

(This is an excerpt from Chapter 23 of Startup CEO, “Collecting Data,” in which I write about the importance of observing and learning from customers and friends of the firm, as well as employees.)

Here’s a story for you that happened 10+ years ago. I’m sitting at the bar of Sam Snead’s Tavern in Port St. Lucie, Florida, having dinner solo while I wait for my friend Karl to arrive. I ask the bartender where he’s from, since he has an accent. Nice conversation about how life is rough in Belfast and thank goodness for the American dream. I ask him what to order for dinner and tell him a couple of menu items I’m contemplating. He says, “I don’t know why they don’t listen to me. I keep telling them that all the people here say that the nachos aren’t good because they don’t have enough beef in them.”

I order something else.

Five minutes later, someone else pounds his hand on the bar and barks out, “Give me a Heineken and a plate of nachos.”

The bartender enters the order into the point-of-sale system.

What’s the lesson? Listen to your front-line employees—in fact, make them your customer research team. I have seen and heard this time and again. Employees deal with unhappy customers, then roll their eyes, knowing full well about all the problems the customers are encountering and also believing that management either knows already or doesn’t care. There’s no reason for this! At a minimum, you should always listen to your customer-facing employees, internalize the feedback and act on it. They hear and see it all. Next best prize: ask them questions. Better yet: get them to actively solicit customer feedback